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Abstract: The 2012 provincial election in Quebec marked a change in government, and the 
election of Quebec’s first woman as Premier.  The campaign was held in a dramatic context 
characterized by nearly three years of allegations of corruption, the apparent decline of the 
sovereignty movement, and the events of the famous “maple spring” which pitted students 
against the Liberal government on the issue of tuition fee hikes.  Two significant new political 
parties, the Coalition Avenir Québec and Option Nationale, also took part in this election.  The 
outcome was a minority government led by Pauline Marois’ Parti Québécois, with stronger than 
expected support for the incumbent Liberal Party of Quebec who finished second with only four 
seats less than the PQ. 
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Résumé: L'élection provinciale de 2012 au Québec a marqué un changement de gouvernement, 
et l'élection d'une première femme à titre de première ministre du Québec. La campagne fut 
tenue dans un contexte dramatique caractérisé par près de trois années d'allégations de 
corruption, de déclin apparent du mouvement souverainiste, et par les événements du fameux 
"printemps érable" qui virent l'affrontement des étudiants et du gouvernement Libéral sur la 
question de la gratuité des études supérieures. Deux nouveaux partis politiques significatifs, la 
Coalition Avenir Québec et Option Nationale, prirent aussi part à l'élection. Le dénouement fut 
un gouvernement minoritaire dirigé par le Parti Québécois de Pauline Marois, avec un soutien 










The outcome of the September 4th 
2012 provincial election in Quebec was 
historic in that, for the first time, voters of 
that province elected a woman – Pauline 
Marois, the leader of the Parti Québécois 
(PQ) – to be Premier of Quebec.  In that 
sense, the province has joined a pan-
Canadian breakthrough because, at the time 
of writing, six of the First Ministers of the 
Canadian provinces and territories are 
women.  Notwithstanding this important 
victory, the PQ’s electoral success was far 
from being impressive however.  The party 
only achieved to win four seats more than 
the incumbent Liberal Party of Quebec 
(LPQ) in the National Assembly, despite the 
fact that the latter had been in power for 
almost a decade.  This new PQ minority 
government thus reflects the struggle that 
that party has been facing ever since its 
crushing 2003 defeat at the hands of Jean 
Charest’s Liberals.  Indeed, one should 
recall that in 2007 the PQ had even been 
marginalized as the second official 
opposition party behind the Action 
Démocratique du Québec (ADQ) (see 
Bélanger 2008). 
Having won a majority in 2008, 
Premier Charest could have waited nearly a 
year more before dissolving the National 
Assembly, yet he chose the 1
st
 of August as 
the start date for the campaign that would 
culminate in an election on the 4
th
 of 
September.  The last year of Liberal 
governance was a succession of low 
satisfaction rates and large-scale 
disagreements with civil society.  Firstly, 
having been in power for nine years had 
made it hard for the party to renew itself.  
For instance, Jean Charest’s “Plan Nord”, 
aimed at boosting economic development 
via the exploitation of Northern Quebec’s 
natural resources, should have been a gather-
together and self-identifying project 
involving many ministries and local 
communities.  But the project had taken 
months to be concretely announced, parts of 
it were still uncertain at the beginning of 
2012, and some Aboriginal communities and 
environment-advocacy groups decided not 
to endorse it.  For Charest’s Liberals, 
reaching a balance between the economy 
and civil society was a hard bet.  Secondly, 
ever since 2009, a constant flow of 
allegations of corruption and collusion made 
in the media and in the National Assembly 
had diminished the public’s trust in the 
Charest government (see, e.g., Marissal 
2009).  A CROP poll from April 2010 
indicated that as many as 74% of Quebecers 
agreed that it was time for a change of 
government in Quebec.  Later that same 
year, an on-line petition asking for the 
resignation of Jean Charest was signed by 
more than 200,000 citizens.  In the fall of 
2011, under increased pressure following the 
leak of a devastating report by Jacques 
Duchesneau, then head of the government’s 
anti-collusion unit, Charest finally agreed to 
create the Charbonneau Commission, aimed 
at shedding light on the extent of corruption 
and collusion in the awarding and 
management of public contracts in the 
construction industry. 
The PQ, and the sovereigntist 
movement more generally, also went 
through a period of turmoil around that same 
period.  In the May 2011 federal election, 
many Quebecers decided to defect from the 
Bloc Québécois (BQ) and to support in mass 
the New Democratic Party (NDP) led – at 
the time – by Jack Layton (see Bélanger and 
Nadeau 2011).  The former leader of the 
BQ, Gilles Duceppe, even lost his 
parliamentary seat.  A whole debate 
surrounding the relevance of the Bloc’s 
existence and the strength of the sovereignty 
movement quickly followed.  These 
existential questions were also asked from 
within the PQ itself.  Four high-profile 






 made a splash by resigning from the 
PQ caucus in June of 2011, publicly 
disavowing Pauline Marois’ leadership and 
her proposed strategy of “gouvernance 
souverainiste”.  Many observers of the 
Quebec political scene hypothesized that 
Gilles Duceppe might potentially take over 
the leadership of the PQ, given that polls 
suggested an eventual PQ win at the next 
provincial election with Duceppe at its head 
(Lajoie 2011).  In January 2012, Duceppe 
finally announced that he was not interested 
in the PQ leadership.  These PQ existential 
woes were quickly forgotten, however, as 
the attention of the whole province turned to 
the student crisis. 
The roots of the so-called “printemps 
érable” (maple spring) go back to the March 
2011 budget, in which Finance Minister 
Raymond Bachand announced the Liberal 
government’s plan to increase annual tuition 
fees from $2,168 to $3,793 over a five-year 
period, representing a 75% increase in the 
cost of higher education.  That budgetary 
measure was going to be effective in 
September of 2012.  This decision triggered 
a protest movement that was unprecedented 
in Quebec for its scope, duration and 
intensity (Stolle et al. 2013).  Several student 
unions voted in favour of a general strike 
without an end-date, to begin in February 
2012.  Thus, from February until June, 
between 170,000 and 200,000 students were 
on strike – meaning that the teaching 
schedule was paralyzed in many 
postsecondary institutions.  Several different 
kinds of protest actions were organized 
throughout the spring, from peaceful 
marches to violent assaults.  The Charest 
government proved inflexible, refusing at 
first to negotiate with the student unions’ 
leaders.  Their first meeting was held on 
April 23
rd
.  The negotiations lasted two 
                                                 
1
  Jean-Martin Aussant, Louise Beaudoin, Pierre 
Curzi, and Lisette Lapointe. 
days; the resulting agreement proved 
unacceptable to the students and triggered a 
series of nightly protests.  With no 
reasonable solution in sight, the government 
adopted a special law (Bill 78)
2
 that imposed 
important restrictions on the right to protest 
as well as a new standardized school 
calendar for striking students.  At that point, 
the student crisis became a larger social one 
as many citizens across the province decided 
to show their disapproval of the Liberal 
government by participating in nightly 
casserole marches, making noise with pots 
and pans.
3
  Summer arrived without anyone 
really noticing, and after a few weeks of 
relative calm Jean Charest decided on 1
st
 of 
August to call an election, partly as a way 





 For the 2012 election, the LPQ, the 
PQ, and Québec Solidaire (QS) remained in 
the ranks.  But they were joined by a record 
number of political parties, for a total of 18 
party formations competing (and 892 
candidates running for seats).  Among these 
smaller parties, two new ones were 
particularly noteworthy. 
 The first was the Coalition Avenir 
Québec (CAQ).  The CAQ’s leader (and co-
founder) was François Legault, an ex-
minister from the Bouchard and Landry 
governments between 1998 and 2003, and a 
PQ MNA until his resignation in June 2009.  
The first rumours to the effect that Legault 
was interested in creating his own political 
                                                 
2
  It became officially titled “An Act to Enable 
Students to Receive Instruction from the 
Postsecondary Institutions They Attend” (Bill 12). 
3
  It should be noted that, according to polls, the 
Quebec population was deeply divided over the issue 
of the tuition fee hike but was clearly against Bill 
78’s measures, perceived as too drastic and 
restrictive. 




party came in the fall of 2010.  A year later, 
the CAQ was officially launched.  Given the 
new party’s ideological closeness to the 
right-of-centre ADQ, and given the fact that 
the ADQ’s finances and membership 
numbers had been shrinking since its 2008 
electoral defeat, merger talks between these 
two party formations quickly began in 
earnest.  The disappearance of the ADQ 
became a reality in January 2012.  The CAQ 
tries to define itself as a right-leaning party 
but without having a clear position on the 
main cleavage that has structured Quebec 
political history (sovereignty-federalism).  
Legault’s party wants to put aside the 
national debate, at least for the time being, 
in order to focus on more pressing 
governance issues in the province, not the 
least of them being the perceived 
government corruption.  The CAQ managed 
to recruit candidates in all 125 ridings, and 
several of them were already well-known 
from the general public. 
 The second new party of interest was 
Option Nationale (ON).  It was created in 
late 2011 by Jean-Martin Aussant, one of the 
four MNAs who had left the PQ that spring.  
Based on the belief that the PQ was not 
pursuing Quebec sovereignty with enough 
commitment anymore, Aussant’s party puts 
the achievement of Quebec’s independence 
as its number one priority, while adopting a 
left-leaning stance on other social issues.  
ON succeeded in recruiting 120 candidates 
across the province. 
 Jean Charest began his campaign by 
emphasizing his usual issue priority, namely 
Quebec’s economic development.  His core 
message was that re-electing the Liberals 
would mean political and economic stability, 
as opposed to a PQ government that would 
be more interested in catering to demands 
from students and “la rue” (i.e., protesters in 
the streets) which would jeopardize the 
province’s, and especially Montreal’s, 
economy.  But other than that, Charest did 
not really offer voters any new reasons for 
keeping his party in power after nine years 
and three mandates.  For her part, Pauline 
Marois’ campaign was very much aimed at 
making her appear as a credible head of 
government who had a solid team behind 
her, ready to govern and replace the LPQ.  
She also made sure to emphasize her 
preference for consensus-building, opposing 
it to the Liberals’ stubborn attitude as 
displayed during the student crisis.  Ethical 
concerns were also an important part of her 
message, in an attempt to tap into the 
public’s dissatisfaction with the Liberal 
government.  However, François Legault 
also addressed the issue of corruption and, 
on the third day of the campaign, announced 
to the total surprise of most observers that 
Jacques Duchesneau – at that point the 
province’s incarnation of public integrity – 
would be candidate for the CAQ.  Due in 
large part to this early announcement by the 
CAQ, corruption issues became the most 
salient of the first week of the campaign 
according to media coverage data (Lawlor 
and Bastien 2013). 
August 9
th
 saw the publication of the 
first polls announcing that Jean Charest 
would probably not be re-elected in his 
riding.  The PQ was receiving 32% of voting 
intentions while the LPQ was close behind 
with 29%.  TV advertisements started to air 
during the next weekend and were mainly 
concerned with corruption and health care 
issues.  Health care was an issue also put 
forward by the CAQ following their 
nomination of another star candidate, Dr. 
Gaétan Barrette. 
The main televised debate was held 
on August 19
th
 and involved four leaders: 
Charest, Marois, Legault, and for the first 
time a co-spokesperson from QS, namely 
Françoise David.  Attacks were mainly 
directed at Jean Charest, but none of the 
leaders stood out from the others, except for 
David.  Her performance was impressive 




because she did not use personal arguments 
and she remained calm throughout.  Charest, 
who constantly had to defend the integrity of 
his party, brought back on the table some of 
the conclusions from an old report (by the 
Moisan Commission) that put the PQ on the 
spot with possible illegal contributions.  
This debate was followed by three more on 
the private television network TVA, 





 the three main leaders 
faced each other in duels. 
During these debates, François 
Legault was able to destabilize Pauline 
Marois a little by bringing up the PQ’s 
promise to allow popular initiative 
referendums (“référendums d’initiative 
populaire” or RIPs).  He asked Marois 
whether allowing RIPs would mean that a 
group of independentist citizens would be 
able to impose a third referendum on 
Quebec sovereignty via a simple petition of 
850,000 signatures.  Marois tried to reassure 
that a PQ government would nonetheless 
keep control of any sovereignty referendum 
agenda but her responses remained vague 
and tentative, and were contradicted by PQ 
candidate Bernard Drainville who was the 
one who had made the RIPs be included in 
the party’s platform (Chouinard 2012).  
During the main televised debate, Françoise 
David – whose QS is a sovereigntist party – 
accused Marois of not being in a hurry 
enough about holding a third sovereignty 
referendum.  In a similar spirit, former PQ 
leader and Premier Jacques Parizeau decided 
not to support his old party, but to support 
Aussant’s Option Nationale instead, because 
that new party put sovereignty at the very 
top of its priority list, contrary to the PQ. 
The above observations serve to 
illustrate two things.  First, the issue of 
sovereignty became more salient in the 
second half of the campaign, after the 
leaders’ debates.  This was partly due to the 
fact that the PQ was shown to have the lead 
in all vote intention polls, and so was 
increasingly becoming under attack from all 
sides and not just from Jean Charest’s 
Liberals.  Second, and related, Pauline 
Marois almost entirely sidelined the 
sovereignty issue in her campaign message 
but was nonetheless forced to address it.  
Her policy priorities were defined as left-
leaning and nationalist, and included the 
significant increase of mining royalties and 
income taxes for the richest strata of society, 
important revisions to Quebec’s French 
language legislation (Bill 101), as well as 
the repatriation of legislative powers from 
Ottawa.  But Marois’ most salient promises 
were those involving the abolition of some 
of the Liberals’ most controversial policy 
decisions: tuition fee hikes, Bill 78, and the 
$200 annual health tax.  Nonetheless, 
sensing that she may be losing some support 
amongst her traditional sovereigntist 
constituency, Marois felt that she had to cry 
out to them, saying “Lâchez-moi pas!” 
(“Don’t let me down!”) during an end-of-
campaign sovereigntist rally. 
Although the student unions had 
decided the week before to temporarily 
suspend their strike and resume the school 
year following Bill 78’s provisions, on 
August 22
nd
 a huge protest march was 
organized in the streets of Montreal to show 
that the student mobilization was still 
present and strong.  Poll data released on 
August 28
th
 still placed the PQ first with 
33% of voting intentions, but now followed 
by the CAQ at 28% and the Liberals at 26%, 
thus suggesting that the CAQ could 
potentially form the next official opposition.  
During the campaign, the CAQ leader 
concentrated his message on policy 
measures that some might qualify as 
populist: cutting income tax, offering a 
family doctor to each citizen of the province, 
making room for the private sector in the 
health care system, reducing public 
expenses, and insinuating that some interest 




groups (like unions) have too much power in 
public decision-making in Quebec.  Also, in 
an attempt to lure the federalist (and 
especially Anglophone) vote, François 
Legault declared that he would vote NO if 
there were a new referendum on 
sovereignty, a statement that was consistent 
with his campaign message about the need 
for Quebecers to focus on more pressing 
concerns than political independence. 
On August 31
st
, other poll results 
confirmed the PQ’s meagre advance but also 
indicated that one fifth of voters were still 
undecided only three days away from the 
vote.  The three main issues that the media 
were covering the most near the end of the 
campaign were the student crisis and 
sovereignty – two polarizing issues – as well 
as Quebec’s economy (Lawlor and Bastien 
2013). 
 
The Outcome and Its Aftermath 
 
On the night of Tuesday, September 
4
th
, the Charest government was defeated by 
just a few seats.  Indeed, Pauline Marois’ PQ 
was elected as a minority government.
4
  Not 
even one percent of votes separated the 
popular support for the two main parties: the 
PQ received 32.0% of the vote and elected 
54 candidates while the LPQ received 31.2% 
of the vote and managed to elect 50 
candidates.  However, Jean Charest was 
defeated in his own riding by the PQ 
candidate with a 7-point advance.  As for the 
CAQ, it received 27.1% of the vote and 
elected 19 candidates, indicating that its 
support was dispersed across the province.  
                                                 
4
  We should note a deplorable event that happened 
that night, right after the announcement of the official 
election results: an assassination attempt was made 
on Pauline Marois at the location where PQ 
supporters gathered to celebrate (Montreal’s 
Métropolis theater).  Marois was safe but one man 
unfortunately died.  At the time of writing, the 
perpetrator Richard Henry Bain is facing 16 charges. 
QS found reasons to celebrate as it watched 
Amir Khadir, its first elected MNA from 
2008, keeping his seat in the riding of 
Mercier, and a second MNA elected under 
the QS banner, Françoise David in the riding 
of Gouin.  As mentioned in the campaign 
section, her performance at the leaders’ 
debate gave her visibility and increased 
public support.  The party nonetheless 
received only 6% of the total vote share, 
although many ridings in the Montreal area 
were tight races between QS and the PQ.  
Option Nationale did not elect any of its 
candidates; even its leader Jean-Martin 
Aussant was defeated by a CAQ candidate 
in the riding of Nicolet-Bécancour.  Aussant 
resigned from ON’s leadership (officially for 
family reasons) in June 2013, leaving that 
party’s future uncertain. 
Considering the political context in 
which the election campaign was held, we 
may have expected turnout to be higher than 
the actual 74.6%.  More Quebecers went to 
the voting booths in 2012 than in 2008, 
where the turnout rate was of 57.3% (the 
lowest rate in Quebec’s history), but it is not 
an extraordinary increase if we compare to 
the 71.2% rate registered in 2007.  In that 
sense, the 2012 election did not really differ 
from the overall negative trend in electoral 
participation observed in most democracies 
in the last decades; and even though the 
election addressed some issues that were 
particularly salient for the youth, their 
participation did not increase by much (Blais 
et al. 2013). 
The election of a minority 
government surprised no one.  The real 
shock was probably the relative success of 
the Liberal Party.  All surveys from the 
different polling firms underestimated the 
Liberal vote.  The phenomenon occurred in 
the subsequent 2013 British Columbia 
election – although in Quebec, pollsters at 
least predicted the right winner.  Polls




Table 1. Quebec Provincial Election Results 









Parti Libéral du Québec 66 42.1 50 31.2 
Parti Québécois 51 35.2 54 32.0 
Coalition Avenir Québec (ADQ in 2008)   7 16.4 19 27.1 
Québec Solidaire   1   3.8   2   6.0 
Parti Vert Quebec   0   2.2   0   1.0 
Option Nationale   -   -   0   1.9 
 
Source: Directeur général des élections du Québec (www.dgeq.qc.ca) 
 
 
specialist Claire Durand offers an interesting 
explanation of this (Durand 2013).  
According to her, at least two factors were 
particularly at play in this election.  First, 
she suggests that when the public debate is 
highly polarized between “right” and 
“wrong” camps, as it was in 2012, then 
supporters of the “wrong” camp (the Liberal 
Party in this case) become much less 
inclined to declare their vote intention to 
pollsters or to answer surveys, which would 
thus create a spiral of silence.  Second, she 
claims that the underrepresentation of 
certain socio-demographic groups in Quebec 
poll samples, most notably the non-
Francophones, also explains flaws in vote 
predictions. 
 How should the fact that Quebec 
voters elected a party advocating the 
achievement of sovereignty be interpreted?  
The election of a PQ government is not 
necessarily synonymous with higher levels 
of popular support for Quebec sovereignty.  
One can first note that the PQ’s vote share 
has slowly been declining since the time of 
the last referendum, from 45% in the 1994 
provincial election to 32% in 2012.  In 
addition, in 2012, “campaign polls released 
by CROP have actually shown a decline in 
sovereignty support during the campaign 
period, as the possibility of a PQ victory 
became more and more real. At the start of 
the campaign, support for sovereignty stood 
at 36%, only slightly lower than in the years 
before. Three weeks later, it had decreased 
to 28%.” (Bélanger and Chhim 2012).  
Sovereignty does not appear to be the most 
salient issue anymore in Quebec, and the 
population seems to prefer to solve other 
societal problems before debating the 
constitutional future of their province again.  
This interpretation seems to hold as well for 
explaining the Bloc defections in the last 
federal election (Nadeau and Bélanger 
2011).  The PQ vote in 2012 was more an 
anti-Charest vote than a pro-sovereignty 
one.  Thus, the PQ’s victory appears to be 
due more to short-term factors than to strong 
and profound nationalist feelings (Nadeau 
and Bélanger 2013). 
 The day after the election, Jean 
Charest resigned from his position as leader 
of the Liberal Party of Quebec despite the 
surprisingly good results his party had just 
had.  (For this reason, it is likely that Charest 
would not have stepped down right away if 
he had held his own seat.)  Three candidates 
competed for the Liberal leadership: 
Philippe Couillard, former Health Care 
Minister; Raymond Bachand, former 
Finance and Revenue Minister; and Pierre 
Moreau, former Transport Minister.  




Couillard was selected as new Liberal leader 
in March 2013, with 58.5% of the first-
round vote in a delegates’ convention.  
CROP survey data showed that at the 
beginning of March, the LPQ was leading 
the polls with 31%, but in April they were 
leading at 38% while the PQ was continuing 
its descent at 25% of vote intentions 
(Corbeil 2013).  It is certainly too soon to 
conclude that the Liberal brand has regained 
all of its lustre, but at least the prospects for 
the LPQ do not look too dim for the next 
provincial election, which is likely to be 
called sooner rather than later given the PQ 
government’s minority status. 
 Although the election outcome was a 
relative disappointment for François 
Legault, the CAQ leader has to be 
commended for bringing his brand new 
party very close to the ADQ’s 2007 level of 
success.  This suggests that the CAQ will be 
a force to reckon with in the next election.  
Even if the party currently is down in the 
polls and thus may not want another election 
right away, the CAQ’s 2012 voter base 
appears to be slightly more homogeneous 
ideologically – at least on the left-right 
dimension – than the former ADQ base 
(Nadeau and Bélanger 2013), which 
suggests that the CAQ occupies a more 
stable niche in the party system than the 
ADQ did, and that it may be easier to keep 
the CAQ’s supporters mobilized in the near 
future than it was for Mario Dumont. 
 In June 2013, Premier Marois 
provided a personal assessment of the first 
ten months of her government.  Some 
electoral promises have been fulfilled.  
Among others, we note the cancellation of 
the tuition fee hikes and the organisation of 
a summit on postsecondary education, the 
shutting down of nuclear power plant 
Gentilly-2, the adoption of a moratorium on 
shale gas, the adoption of a bill restricting 
party financing by citizens and of another 
one about the integrity of public contracts.  
But many controversial decisions have also 
been made and criticized.  For instance, one 
can think of major cuts in the funding for 
public day care centres, far-reaching 
revisions to Bill 101 that had to be 
considerably toned down, the addition of 
conditions for obtaining social aid, and the 
non-abolition of the health tax.  Many tough 
decisions came in an austerity budget 
introduced early when the Liberals were still 
leaderless and thus let pass.  All in all, a year 
on, the Marois government’s record appears 
rather mixed, although it has certainly 
accomplished more than less considering its 
minority situation.  One factor that may 
matter in the next election campaign, 
whenever it is called, are the new electoral 
laws of popular party financing which now 
limit individual contributions to a maximum 
of 100$ per party per year (while firms and 
organizations remain forbidden to donate to 
parties). The new measures are more 
constraining since they require more efforts 
on the part of parties to replenish their 
coffers.  Whether these provisions will help 
regain Quebecers’ confidence in their 
democratic institutions after the debates and 





Bélanger, Éric, “The 2007 Provincial Election in 
Quebec,” Canadian Political Science Review, 
vol.2, no.1, 2008. 
 
Bélanger, Éric, and Chris Chhim, “Is the 
Independence Issue Back on the Agenda in 
Quebec?”, e-International Relations, 21 October 




Bélanger, Éric, and Richard Nadeau, “The Bloc 
Québécois: Capsized by the Orange Wave,” in 
Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan (eds.), 
The Canadian Federal Election of 2011, Toronto: 
Dundurn Press, 2011. 
 




Blais, André, Carol Galais, and François Gélineau, 
“La participation électorale,” in Frédérick 
Bastien, Éric Bélanger, and François Gélineau 
(eds.), Les Québécois aux urnes: les partis, les 
médias et les citoyens en campagne, Quebec: 
Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2013. 
 
Chouinard, Tommy, “Le député Drainville contredit 
Marois”, La Presse, 24 August 2012, p.A8 
 
Corbeil, Michel, “Sondage CROP: la marque libérale 





Durand, Claire, “Les sondages et l’élection 
québécoise de 2012,” in Frédérick Bastien, Éric 
Bélanger, and François Gélineau (eds.), Les 
Québécois aux urnes: les partis, les médias et les 
citoyens en campagne, Quebec: Presses de 
l’Université de Montréal, 2013. 
 
Lajoie, Geneviève, “Seul Duceppe peut battre 
Legault,” Le Journal de Montréal, 30 October 




Lawlor, Andrea, and Frédérick Bastien, “La 
campagne vue par la presse écrite,” in Frédérick 
Bastien, Éric Bélanger, and François Gélineau 
(eds.), Les Québécois aux urnes: les partis, les 
médias et les citoyens en campagne, Quebec: 
Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2013. 
 
Marissal, Vincent, “Une année sous le signe de la 
corruption,” La Presse, 29 December 2009, p.A20 
 
Nadeau, Richard, and Éric Bélanger, “Un modèle 
général d’explication du vote des Québécois,” in 
Frédérick Bastien, Éric Bélanger, and François 
Gélineau (eds.), Les Québécois aux urnes: les 
partis, les médias et les citoyens en campagne, 
Quebec: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 
2013. 
 
Stolle, Dietlind, Eva Falk Pedersen, Allison Harell, 
and Pascale Dufour, “Le « printemps érable » et 
l’élection québécoise de 2012,” in Frédérick 
Bastien, Éric Bélanger, and François Gélineau 
(eds.), Les Québécois aux urnes: les partis, les 
médias et les citoyens en campagne, Quebec: 
Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2013. 
 
